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To Remote Third Parties
Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
Schein v. Chasen,' utilizing common law principles, held that
one who is given a "tip" by a corporate insider also acquires the
insider's fiduciary duties to the corporation. As a result, the
"tippee" must refrain from trading in the corporation's securities
until the information is publicly disclosed. The purpose of the
rule is to prevent the unfair use of information which is not
available to the general public.2 The legal issues raised by Schein
with respect to the obligations of persons other than corporate
insiders3 who acquire non-public corporate information have im-
portant implications for the securities industry and the invest-
ing public.
Stockholders in Lum's, Inc., a Florida corporation engaged in
restaurant franchising, brought a derivative common law action4
against the corporate president, Melvin Chasen, and his alleged
"tippees." 5 The suit sought damages 6 alleged to have been caused
1. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. "Tipping" is considered violative of the basic policy that requires uni-
form disclosure of corporate information to the investing public. See
Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 28 N. L. REV. 189 (1968). It has been pointed out, how-
ever, that "tipping" and insider trading may be necessary evils of
the securities industry. See H. ANN, INSIDER TRADING A T
STocK 1A=KT ch. 5 (1966).
3. The term "insider" denotes one who has a direct fiduciary duty to
a corporation by virtue of his position as an officer, director or ma-jority stockholder. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. The action was limited to common law because there were no short-
swing profits to bring the action under the purview of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16b, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), nor could
the corporation commence an action under Rule 10b-5 of the Act, 17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1973), because Lum's had not traded the securities
on its own account. See Comment, Distinguishing Between Direct
and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1962).
5. The individual defendants were Chasen, Benjamin Simon, Lehman
Brothers, Eugene Sit, James Jundt, Investors Variable Payment Fund
and IDS New Dimensions Fund. Chasen, Sit and Jundt were granted
motions to dismiss in the trial court because they had not been prop-
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by the defendants' use of inside information in selling their Lum's
holdings and demanded that any profits realized from such exploi-
tation be disgorged and paid back to Lum's.
Chasen learned that Lum's earnings prospects for fiscal year
1970 were not as optimistic as the public had been led to believe.7
Prior to public disclosure of the updated information, Chasen al-
legedly "tipped" the revised figures to a stockbroker employed by
Lehman Brothers. He, in turn, relayed the information to a port-
folio manager of a mutual fund who immediately telephoned an-
other portfolio manager. At their direction, the funds sold all of
their Lum's holdings at a price in excess of what they would have
realized had they sold after the information was made public.8
The trial court dismissed the proceeding for failure to state
a cause of action under Florida law.9 On appeal, the stockholders
erly served under the New York Long Arm Statute. N.Y. CIV. PRAC.§§ 302(a), 313 (McKinney 1972). Simon filed a motion to dismiss
on the same grounds but it was not acted upon. 478 F.2d at 819.
6. Although it is not clear what the precise nature of damages claimed
to have been caused Lum's was, it would appear that under the rule
of Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.
2d 78 (1969), no actual damage would have to be proved; the mere
involvement of a corporate officer creates a presumption that the
good will of the corporation is tarnished. 478 F.2d at 822-23. The
question of damages presented in "tippee" situations like the fact pat-
tern in Schein is extremely complex owing to the anonymity of stock
market transactions. See Comment, Insider's Liability Under Rule
10b-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE
L.J. 864 (1969). Note that while Schein was intent upon establishing
a disincentive to insider trading, a requirement which demands dis-
gorging of profits over and above the sale price of the stock after
confidential information is made public, augers against a disincentive.
The "tippee" has nothing to lose by trading on his "tip"; the least
he will be able to realize is the fair market value of the stock. See
note 8 and accompanying text infra.
7. Chasen had originally quoted earnings prospects of approximately $1
to $1.10 per share when he addressed a seminar of securities industry
members in November of 1969. The adjusted figures that he "tipped"
to Simon were approximately 760 per share. 478 F.2d at 820.
8. After the adjusted figures were made public, the price per share
dipped from $17.50 to $14. The funds altogether sold a total of 83,00{
shares realizing $274,500 more than they would have had they waited
until after public disclosure of the figures. 478 F.2d at 820-21.
9. The trial court arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed
to state a cause of action under Florida law and, since it was the
applicable law, dismissed the action. Gildenhorn v. Lum's Inc., 335
F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court of appeals found that since
the question of liability was one of first impression in Florida, it was
proper to consider the law of other jurisdictions in order to decide
the question. As pointed out in the dissent, it is puzzling that the
court did not use Florida's certified question statute, FLA. STAT. ANN.
'TIPPEE' LIABILITY
argued that relief should be granted on the basis of Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 10 a New York decision, which held that corporate direc-
tors and officers who acquire inside information by virtue of their
positions, may not use that information to their own advantage
by trading without full disclosure. Diamond sought to discourage
insider trading by fashioning a remedy from existing agency prin-
ciples." The court reasoned that when a corporate official, who
is entrusted with certain information, uses it to his own advantage,
he holds any realized profits in constructive trust for the corpor-
ation.12
Although the Diamond rule has been challenged as being a
questionable expansion of common law agency principles,'3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had little
trouble extending its reach to remote third parties. Schein held
that the duty owed by a corporate officer extends to those who
acquire confidential information through him. The court reasoned
that the "tippees" were clothed with fiduciary duties to Lum's the
same as if they were Lum's officials,' 4 even though the informa-
tion was received through intermediaries.
As primary authority for its position, the court made use of
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Agency
Section 31215 which provides that one who causes or assists an
agent to violate his fiduciary duties also becomes a fiduciary. Spe-
cial note was made of the section's comment 0'6 which, in effect,
§ 25.031 (1961). This would have enabled the court to avoid specu-
lation as to what the Florida Supreme Court would have done. 478
F.2d at 828.
10. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
11. Diamond made use of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 388(1958). This section, in effect, prohibits the abuse of employer-em-
ployee relationships and the commentary expressly mentions corpo-
rate officers. 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
81.
12. Additionally, Diamond saw the misuse of inside information as a con-
version of corporate assets. See Note, Securities-Inside Information
as a Corporate Asset, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 576.
13. See Comment, A Comparison of Insider Liability Under Diamond v.
Oreamuno and Federal Securities Law, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV.
499 (1970).
14. 478 F.2d at 823.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958) provides: "A person
who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or as-
sists an agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability
to the principal."
16. Comment c to § 312 states in part:
A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating
his duty to his principal, receives confidential information
from the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it and re-
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states that one who receives information and knows that it is
given to him in violation of the informant's fiduciary duties
may be required to hold any profits gained from the use of such
information in a constructive trust. A cursory reading of the sec-
tion and its comment indicates that it may be compatible with the
principle espoused in Schein, but the section's characterization of
the sanctioned conduct should be closely scrutinized. The section
places liability only upon one who "causes or assists an agent to
violate a duty to his principal ... .17 Comment c, however, envi-
sions liability in a situation where the only requirement is that
the individual have "notice that an agent is ... violating his duty
to his principal. . . ."18 The Restatement's requirement that lia-
bility is imposed only on those who "cause or assist" an agent to
violate a duty to his principal may have prompted the court's
following statement:
Although there is no allegation in the complaints that a prior ex-
plicit agreement existed between Chasen and the defendants, it is
obvious that the sequence of events detailed in the pleadings, if
proved, will substantiate the existence of a common enterprise
19
Judge Kaufman, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that there
was no basis for determining that the facts, as alleged, demon-
strated a common enterprise on the part of the defendants. 20  Al-
though he agreed that a disincentive to insider trading was
needed, he argued that the method used by the majority was
based upon a misapplication of the Diamond rule and a misunder-
standing of section 312. His interpretation of the Diamond rule
would limit its application to corporate officers and directors
who actually trade in their own securities. 21
Viewed solely as a common law decision, Schein unquestion-
ably expands the Diamond rule by establishing remote "tippee" li-
quired to hold profits received by its use as a constructive
trustee.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. 478 F.2d at 822.
20. "[T]he facts simply do not comport with the concept of a joint en-
terprise, a term which implies the existence of a prior plan to carry
out a mutually beneficial project." Id. at 827.
21. Judge Kaufman found significance in the fact that the complaint in
Diamond was dismissed against certain directors who merely "acqui-
esced" in the insider trading. According to Kaufman, not only is
the Diamond rule limited to corporate directors and officers, it applies
only to those officials who have actually traded and recognized a
personal benefit. Id. at 827.
'TIPPEE' LIABILITY
ability, something heretofore not recognized by common law deci-
sions.
22
At common law, courts have been constrained to attach liabil-
ity to a "tippee" and have done so only where the "tippee" could
also have been classified as an insider.23  Apparently, there is a
requirement that the "tippee" occupy a position of trust or share
in a confidential relationship created apart from the mere giving
and receiving of information. He is then considered to have
breached a position of trust when he receives confidential infor-
mation. Such a separate position of trust is illustrated by the sit-
uation where the "tippee" is also an employee in the insider's cor-
poration or has vested interests to be served by the misuse of in-
side information.24 Merely receiving and using confidential infor-
maton as a "tippee" did not create liability.
Although some form of "tippee" liability might be implicit in
certain common law principles, particularly the Restatement of
Restitution, 25 it is apparent that some nexus must exist between
the insider and his "tippee" before the latter can be assumed to
have taken on any fiduciary responsibility. This nexus is generally
considered in terms of a "sufficient link" between the insider and
his "tippee" which can be established by showing that a "knowing
confederation" existed between the two individuals.26 Establishing
22. Outside of Schein, no common law decision has found remote "tippees"
to be liable. See Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55.
23. See, e.g., cases cited by Schein as authority for the principle that
one can acquire another's fiduciary duties, Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135
F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch.
241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927).
In Quinn the court distinguished between "technical" and "normal"
fiduciaries. In Sharp "tippees" were also employees of the injured
corporation as was the defendant in Brophy. In each decision it is
clear that the position of trust and not the mere use of information
was determinative of the fiduciary responsibility.
24. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brophy v. Cities
Service Co., 31 Del Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949). See also note 23 supra
and decisions cited therein.
25. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITTIoN § 201(2) (1937) provides:
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary
communicates confidential information to a third person, the
third person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which
he makes through the use of such information.
The section was cited in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
912 n.17 (1961), a decision where the fiduciary duties of insiders were
carefully studied. See note 30 and accompanying text infra; Rapp
& Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule lOb-5, 1971 U. I LL. L.F. 55.
26. See 6 L. Loss, SEcuRT=s REGULATioN 3556-68 (2d ed. 1961, Supp.
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the nexus of "knowing confederation" between an insider and one
who is the indirect recipient of his information is difficult. One
must necessarily ask: What is the relationship between the insider
and the remote "tippee"?
The Restatement language relied upon in Schein conceivably
subsumes a "knowing confederation" requirement by its use of the
terminology "cause or assist." Arguably, the court interpreted this
language to require a joint and common enterprise before liabil-
ity can be established. The term "joint and common enterprise"
has an established legal meaning and has been defined as
something like a partnership, for a more limited period of time,
and a more limited purpose. It is an undertaking to carry out a
small number of acts or objectives, which is entered into by asso-
ciates under such circumstances that all have an equal voice in
directing the conduct of the enterprise. The law then considers
that each is the agent or servant of the others, and that the act of
any one within the scope of the enterprise is to be charged vicari-
ously against the rest.27
Yet, the court's use of comment c seems to indicate that notice
of the breach of trust may be the only requirement in establish-
ing "tippee" liability. One is left in the uncomfortable position
of determining what the exact prerequisites are to remote "tip-
pee" liability. There are several alternative interpretations of the
court's decision, each with its own separate result.
First, it can be assumed that the decision requires the existence
of a joint and common enterprise as a condition precedent to
"tippee" liability. Viewed in that light, Schein is of little conse-
quence because it is apparent that older decisions would have at-
tached liability where there was active solicitation on the part
of the "tippee." The defendant in this type of situation is actually
a primary participant in the wrongdoing, rather than an aider or
abettor of the misconduct. 28
On the other hand, the court's decision might be interpreted as
requiring only notice as a condition precedent to liability. Such
an interpretation would place heavy emphasis on the court's use
of comment c and that comment's use of the phrase: "with no-
tice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal."
A notice requirement would clearly require less than would a
1969), [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586
(1921); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
27. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (4th ed. 1971).
28. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aid-
ing and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Parn Delicto, Indemnification and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
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showing of joint or common enterprise, but it is unclear what kind
of notice is contemplated. Should the notice be actual or con-
structive?
Although Schein did not deal with the question of whether ac-
tual notice is required, the omission of such an inquiry may be
discounted to some extent by the fact that all of the defendants
were accomplished technicians in the securities industry. Conse-
quently, it may be implicit in the court's holding that constructive
knowledge will suffice. Perhaps, the court felt that the expert
"tippee" has a duty of inquiry-a higher standard to measure
up to in his daily business activity.29
Assuming, arguendo, that constructive notice is sufficient to
establish liability, one is left to ask whether it makes a difference
if the "tippee" comes by his information directly from the insider
or indirectly, i.e., is the "tippee" a remote or direct recipient?
Perhaps the remoteness of the individual "tippee" should be con-
sidered. As information is passed from hand to hand, the materi-
ality of it becomes diluted and it is less likely to spark inquiry
as to its origin.30 It is arguable that one who receives informa-
tion third or even fourth-hand has no duty to inquire as to the
origin or confidentiality of the information. He is certainly less
likely to suspect that the information is given to him in breach
of a fiduciary duty.
Construed as requiring a joint and common enterprise on the
part of an insider and his "tippees" as a prerequisite to "tippee"
liability, Schein is fairly unremarkable. On the other hand,
should the decision be interpreted as merely requiring notice of
the breach of fiduciary duty, Schein may be the beginning of nearly
29. At least one writer has voiced the opinion that an expert "tippee"
has a duty to investigate information that is given to him. See
Gluckman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 Kp . L. REV. 47 (1971). The
fact that Chasen's "tippees" were experts in their field may be indi-
cative of this type of philosophy.
30. Such a view is not unique to the writers in the area. See 6 Loss
at 3563; 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRiTIEs LAW: FRAuD--SEC RuLE 10b-5 §
7.5 (1967), as supplemented, [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. "Since
the information tends to be generalized and distorted as it passes
from hand to hand, remoter tippees probably will have less responsi-
bility under this criterion [specificity of information] than the origi-
nal tippees." Id. at § 7.5. Professor Bromberg deals with the dilu-
tion of information as part of his test to determine degrees of "tippee"
culpability. His test looks to the specificity of the information, its
probable accuracy, the "tippee's" knowledge of the information's
source and whether the information's materiality has been affected
by subsequent stages of "tipping."
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unlimited "tippee" liability. Should constructive notice suffice as
the propagating factor in establishing liability, there seems to be
little that would mitigate in favor of even the most remote "tippee."
Of course, it is possible that Schein may be limited to its facts. It is
of no small consequence that the individual "tippees" were experts
in their field, but it is impossible to determine the relevance of this
fact since the court failed to discuss its implications.
The impact of Schein is not limited to common law actions.
At least for future second circuit decisions, Schein gives some
indication of the court's view of existing securities law. There
is little doubt that had the action come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5, 31 the court would have had little problem finding liability.32
In fact, the court drew an analogy between the kind of liability
imposed upon the defendants and that imposed on defendants in
10b-5 actions. 33
31. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1973). Rule 10b-5 is the hub of antifraud ac-
tions. It reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of a national ex-
change,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
32. The court analogized the liability of remote "tippees" to a number
of 10b-5 decisions:
In passing we note decisions dealing with violations of the
federal securities laws which involve the imposition of lia-
bility on defendants who have occupied statuses similar to
statuses occupied by defendants in this case .... Further-
more, "tippee liability," which is analogous to the liability
being imposed upon Diversified and Investors, has been es-
tablished in federal cases involving violations of the securi-
ties laws.
478 F.2d at 824 n.8. The court made reference to: SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951).
33. Special note was made of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961), and Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Cady,
the probable beginning of "tippee" liability under Rule 10b-5, a pro-
ceeding by the SEC against the brokerage firm of Cady, Roberts &
Co. applied an "access test" to persons who were in a position to
receive and exploit inside information. A partner in the brokerage
received a "tip" from a co-employee who also happened to be a di-
TIPPEE LIABILITY
Once again, however, Schei.'s use as a barometer in deter-
mining the court's attitude toward 10b-5 litigants depends upon
the joint and common enterprise/notice distinction. Should mere
constructive notice be sufficient to establish remote "tippee"
liability, there may indeed be marked changes in store for existing
10b-5 liability.
Unhappily, much of Schein's import rests with the court's off-
hand reference to a joint and common enterprise and the deci-
sion's precedential value may very well turn on the interpretation
given to the court's use of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
Section 312 and its attendant comment c.
rector of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation. The "tip" stated that Cur-
tiss-Wright soon would announce a reduction in its quarterly divi-
dend. Before the announcement could be made public, the partner
sold portions of his wife's and other stockholders' Curtiss-Wright
holdings. The SEC emphasized the existence of a relationship which
gave the partner access to confidential information. Noting that the
wording of Rule lOb-5 is phrased in terms of "any person," the Com-
mission determined that the position of an insider was not necessarily
limited to actual corporate structure.
These three groups [officers, directors and controlling stock-
holders], however, do not exhaust the classes of persons upon
whom there is such an obligation. Analytically, the obliga-
tion rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of
a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to informa-
tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.
40 S.E.C. at 912.
Ross expanded the Cady view by determining that certain defend-
ants could be classified as insiders because of their access to inside
information or "tippees" because of their knowledge that a fiduciary
duty was breached. The interesting thing about Ross is the dual role
it gave to the defendants. Accord, Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. Of course, remote "tippee" liability is already existent in the 10b-5
area by virtue of Investors Management Co., Inc., [1970-1971 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 78,163 (SEC 1971). There the
SEC recognized that remote "tippees" were within the scope of Rule
10b-5 and set forth certain required elements dispositive of liability:
We consider those elements to be that the information in
question be material and non-public; that the tippee, whether
he receives the inforimation directly or indirectly, know or
have reason to know that it was non-public and had been
obtained improperly or by selective revelation or otherwise,
and that the information be a factor in his decision to effect
the transaction.
Id. at 80,519. Schein indicates that through some interpretations of
its application of the Restatement of Agency, remote "tippee" liability
can be virtually unlimited.
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In any event, future unhappy purchasers in the securities mar-
ket will have new common law ammunition without the complex-
ity of 10b-5 and the limitations of prior common law decisions.
The flexibility of interpretation will ensure a place of importance
for Schein.
Dennis A. Graham '75
